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1.  The position and the argument 
The principal thesis defended here is that natural selection is best viewed as a causal theory.  The main 
argument will be a normative, historical one: the theory was originally constructed as a causal theory, 
and nothing done to it since has made it less so.  I shall argue that we can best assess various current 
suggestions - such as that fitnesses are supervenient on physical properties; that fitnesses are 
propensities (probabilistic dispositions), and how natural selection is distinguishable from random drift 
-  by asking persistently about the causal re lationships ( and hence causal –explanatory relationships) in 
question. 
2.  The main challenge 
The leading modifications to the understanding of natural selection since Darwin can be put under four 
headings: Mendelism, molecular biology, multilevel selectionism, and mathematics.  The first three are 
broadly empirical and causal and, it will be argued, introduce no radical transformation to the structure 
of causal inquiry and explanation, only complementary extensions.  Mathematics, as such, I take to be 
not  causal and so without causal-explanatory import. Among all the diverse philosophies of 
mathematics, none, it seems, requires us to credit mathematics with adding extra causal-explanatory 
content to any theory when it is brought into its formulations.  In understanding the transformations of 
the theory of natural selection since Darwin, one should make, then, a sharp distinction between its 
causal-explanatory enhancement by Mendelism, molecular biology, and multilevel selectionism, and its 
representational and derivational reformulations through novel mathematics; for these reformulations 
have not and could not have constituted, in themselves, causal-explanatory innovations. 
3.  The way forward 
By making causality the prime focus, various unhelpful legacies from logical positivism and from some 
more recent philosophies can be circumvented.  Because casusality is not (pace Carnap and others), 
explicable as predictability, one needs to distinguish throughout between the causal   import of natural 
selection theory and the predictive import, and so between the ontic and the epistemic, as Wesley 
Salmon would put it.  The concept of fitness belongs on the epistemic side of this great divide, once 
fitnesses are construed, as they should be, as reproductive expectancies analogous to life expectancies 
and as having, like them, no causal efficacy nor, therefore, any causal-explanatory import.  Within the 
mathematics of fitness differences, where there is no gap between expectancies and their fulfilments, 
and so within the derivations of the predictive consequences of these expectancies, there is no ground 
for reifying the formal abstractions into general causes conforming to universal laws.  The theory of 
natural selection is explanatory because it is causal, not because it is nomic.  Its causes and its causal 
processes are not usefully likened to forces in classical – nor, I suspect, in quantum physics – for forces 
are most plausibly construed (as by Ellis), not as causes, but as causal relationships; and in any case, 
there are no very edifying analogs in evolutionary theory to force laws or to force/mass relationships.  
Mechanics-envy, like positivism (which often suffered from that condition), misleads us concerning the 
structure and function of natural selection theory. 
 
When - in a forthcoming paper with two other coauthors - Dennis Walsh counters his one-time mentor 
Elliott Sober’s claim that evolutionary theory is a theory of forces by saying that no, it is not a dynamic 
theory, but a statistical theory about population structure, one should gently insist that they have both 
erred and that there is a preferable third view: not forces, nor statistics, but causal processes. 
                                                             
1
 This is an abstract of a presentation based on my paper in volume two of  K. Gigerenzer et al (eds.), 
The Probabilistic Revolution, MIT Press. 1987. For a recent piece in the same causalist  vein, see 
Roberta Millstein’s 2002 paper ‘Are random drift and n atural selection conceptually distinct?’ Biology 
and Philosophy 17 (1): 1-31. 
Natural Selection: A Causal Theory1 
Jon Hodge 
 4.  Natural Selection and the theory of theories 
Whether any post-positivist theory of theories – the semantic view, for instance – is much better at 
illuminating natural selection theory remains, despite several valuable analyses, an open question.  For 
the question has not yet been properly posed, I would respectfully submit.  To frame it appropriately, 
one would have to ask how far some theory of theories illumines natural selection not as a 
mathematically formulable theory, not as a nomically unifying theory, not as an axiomatisable – or 
otherwise – theory, but as a causal theory descending, with no discontinuous modifications in the 
structure of its causal –explanatory inquiries, from the version first offered by Darwin. 
 
  
 
 
It is a special pleasure and a privilege to comment on the 2002 abstract and the 1987 paper of my 
former Leeds colleague Jon Hodge.  Jon is one of the foremost Darwinian scholars and he has brought 
to the great Darwin industry his formidable knowledge of nineteenth century biology and philosophy 
and his fruitful commingling of historiographical and philosophical enquiry, a feature dear to the 
Pittsburgh department.   
 
In his abstract he asks: 
 
 ‘. . . how far some theory of theories – the semantic view, for instance – illumines natural selection 
not as a mathematically-formulable theory , not as a nomically-unifying theory, not as an 
axiomatizable or otherwise-theory, but as a causal theory descending, with no discontinuous 
modifications in the structure of its causal-explanatory inquiries, from the version first offered by 
Darwin.’  
 
Clearly there are a number of approaches to a philosophical analysis of the status of Darwinian theory 
that he does not like.  Instead he favors causal theories, but not those involving causal relationships as 
in Newtonian theory, and he chooses causal proces ses rather than causal events - following here the 
lead of Wes Salmon.  But what does he mean by ‘the structure of its causal-explanatory inquiries’? 
Here he could be referring to the vera causa principle advocated by Newton, extended by Thomas Reid 
and used by Charles Lyell  -  namely causes that can be called real because of their existence, their 
competence  to account for the phenomenon in question, and their observed responsibility  for that 
phenomenon .  But I suspect he has in mind something else – namely the form or structure of the theory 
rather than any empirical and nomic content that might be claimed for it.   This places us in the 
semantic theory-of-theories world of Patrick Suppes and van Frassen, and more specifically it reminds 
us of John Beatty’s paper: ‘What’s Wrong with the Received View of Evolutionary Theory?’ (1980) 
Beatty explained that the Hardy-Weinberg equation and the Mendelian laws upon which it is based are 
dependent upon meiosis which is subject to many exceptions, a process that has been evolved  and 
could be altered, we might suggest, in the future course of evolution.  Therefore he favored viewing the 
theory of natural selection in the light of the semantic approach as stating the kind of system into which 
the empirical data fit.  
 
Since Jon has referred us to his ’87 paper ‘Natural Selection as a Causal, Empirical, and Probabilistic 
Theory’, I will use that where possible to expand on his abstract. This paper was written for a 
conference series held in the years 1982/83 on The Pro babilistic Revolution where one of the issues 
discussed was the ‘distinction between epistemic and ontic interpretations of probability.’  The editors 
of the volume pointed out that the increasing use of statistics was not necessarily associated with a 
trend to an ontic interpretation of probability.  Indeed besides probabilistic revolutions in the sciences 
‘there were counter-probabilistic revolutions’.    Hodge by no means denies Natural Selection a place in 
the sun of the probabilistic revolution, but he regrets that empiricism in its more positivistic forms ‘has 
construed the main questions about evidence and explanation in science as questions about universal 
statements of law rather than existential claims for causation.’  Having by then witnessed two decades 
of criticism of the positivist tradition he saw the eighties as ‘an appropriate time to develop further the 
original  interpretation of natural selection, i.e., Darwin’s, as a causal and empirical theory.’  In the 
abstract for this workshop he adds that evolutionary theory is neither a matter of forces, nor of statistics 
but of causal processes.  So we are all enjoined to cast aside ‘mechanics -envy’, stop being mesmerized 
by sophisticated mathematical representations of the evolutionary process, and to mark and inwardly 
digest the ‘deep divide’ that exists between the predictive import of natural selection and its causal 
import, between the epistemic and the ontic. As for axiomatizing Natural Selection – away with it!  
Down with nomically -unifying it. Get back to Darwin and we will get it right – the password is ‘cause’.  
 
I say ‘Amen’ to that, and to Darwin’s judgment that natural selection is the chief but not the only cause 
of evolutionary change:  but let’s not go too far.  I do have some reservations about Darwin worship, 
especially if it comes from the Darwin industry.  
Comments on Jon Hodge’s paper 
Robert Olby 
 
  
From the point of view of the philosopher this turn of affairs does represent some carnage.  Those who 
want to express natural selection in mathematical equations – play the fundamental theorem  game, 
might be disappointed, even affronted. Can’t we effect a rescue operation somehow?  For instance, 
couldn’t we save axiomatization?  I turned to Alexander Rosenberg’s The Structure of Biological 
Science (1985) and studied his account of Mary Williams’ axiomatization (1970).  It has five axioms, 
and as Rosenberg remarks its’ Achilles’ heel is that the term ‘fitness’ is a primitive.  As far as I can see 
Chevalier Lamarck would have been happy with all five of Williams’ axioms (except perh aps the 
possibility of extinctions)!  The axiomatization has to be so expansive in its claims – its terms, 
Rosenberg tells us, do not restrict it to any place or time in the universe!  Indeed some renditions of 
Mendelian genetics that I have encountered in  reading about axiomatization look as if they refer to life 
on another planet, not this one. Hence it pleases me that Jon Hodge appears not to like axiomatization 
any more than I do.   
 
Perhaps post-positivism has resources for the restoration of sanity?  Does the semantic approach offer 
greater scope for the diversity of the phenomena in the evolutionary process and is it comfortable with 
the absence from evolutionary biology of any exceptionless laws?  Yes, and this has been well argued 
by Beatty, although he did not make clear just how diverse are the phenomena of organic evolution.  
Consider, for instance the prokaryotes (bacteria):  they constitute a major part of the life on this earth.  
In every gram of soil there are on average not a million but a billion bacteria. They clean our water, 
breakdown organic refuse, nitrify the soil, they have exploited every conceivable environment from hot 
geysers to frozen soils , deep ocean rifts with pressures of one thousand atmospheres, salt pans, sulfur 
and iron deposits. You name it, they live in it or feed from it – even petroleum and kerosene are food 
for some bacteria.  What a remarkable story of evolutionary divergence the bacteria present, and how 
crucial are their activities for all other forms of life. Yet Mendelian segregation and recombination 
through sexual reproduction involving meiosis and whole genome transfer ? – not in bacteria: some of 
them practice conjugation (which is not fertilization) but you cannot do Mendelian- breeding 
experiments with bacteria.  What, then, has a theory of natural selection couched in terms of the 
population genetics of Hardy/Weinberg, itself based upon Mendelian genetics to offer them?  As 
Beatty has emphasized, evolution had first to give rise to meiosis, hence a general theory of natural 
selection has to rely on no specific form of gene transfer but should embrace in its generality bacterial 
conjugation (plasmid transfer), transduction (viral transfer) and transformation (DNA transfer).  What 
the bacteria and higher forms of life share is an hereditary material – DNA – and the processes of its 
replication, recombination and mutation. These processes are not just molecular events. For in one way 
or another they involve virtually the whole cell.   
 
Hodges distinguishes two aspects of natural selection: 
 
1. Its predictive import , expressed in terms of  fitness as reproductive expectancies  analogous to 
life expectancies (an apt analogy due to Hodge) and  having no causal efficacy, its formal 
abstractions undeserving of reification.   
 
2. 2. Its causal import, adaptation (often referred to also as fitness – a bad habit, but rife in the 
literature), this is of course relative to the physical and biotic environment.  
 
Why is it so important to distinguish these two imports of natural selection?  Hodge claims that with 
the causal import we can avoid the criticism of natural selection that it is a tautology, and we should be 
able to distinguish what has been due to drift from what has been caused by selection (Megan 
Delehanty will be discussing this point).   One might add that adaptation  includes the means a species 
has used for preserving its favorable genetic constitution – i.e., speciation. 
 
Now Natural Selection is not evolution. Granted the distinctive character of the Darwinian theory of 
evolution rest principally upon natural selection, but the Darwinian theory is more like a cluster of 
theories. Not all elements of the cluster are necessarily involved at any one time.  This brings me to 
Jon’s remark that Mendelism, molecular biology, and multilevel selectionism have enhanced the theory 
of Natural Selection. Can we be sure that none of these will revise it?  The revelations of 
developmental genetics have caused some to raise again the question whether macroevolution is 
microevolution writ large or something else?  Hodge’s emphasis on causal processes rather than wide-
ranging axioms is surely the choice to make if we want an answer.  I suggest, however, there is a 
difficulty about separating the ontic from the epistemic so sharply.  We need the latter to establish the 
 status of the former, i.e., to show that mutation and selection are adequate to account for evolutionary 
change we analyze the empirical data with the aid of the mathematics of population genetics, we also 
simulate the process therewith.  Just how distinct, then, are the ontic and the epistemic in practice? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I will focus on Hodge’s primary claim that natural selection is best viewed as a causal theory rather 
than a dynamic (as represented by Sober
2
) or statistical theory (as claimed by Walsh et al.
3
, and less 
exclusively by Brandon).  In particular, I want to look at how we should understand the notion of cause 
or causal process in the context of fitness.  
 
In his abstract and his 1987 paper
4
, Hodge makes two points that are important in relating his position 
to others’, and particularly to those we will hear more about tomorrow.  First, he says that he takes 
mathematics, as such, to be “not causal and so without causal-explanatory import” (Hodge abstract, 
section 2).  Yet, proponents of statistical interpretations of selection and drift clearly intend that this 
account is explanatory – where does the disagreement come in?  Second, he clearly states (again in his 
1987 paper) that he takes selection to be a process.  Since this is a matter of dispute in Brandon and 
Millstein’s papers 5, I suggest we look at whether Hodge’s position on this point actually is identical to 
Millstein’s and where the disagreement with Brandon occurs. 
 
With regard to the first point, Hodge points out that in addition to the standard conditions required for 
selection to occur (variation, heritability of variation, and differential reproduction of heritable 
variation), there must be specified some further criterion which can distinguish selection from drift.  On 
this much, there is no disagreement.  Hodge’s next step is to claim that specification of this further 
criterion must “take into account both the judgments which are already being made as to which real or 
imaginary processes count or would count as natural selection” (as well as being guided by the 
questions motivating the historical development of the theory).  Doing so, he says, brings us to “an 
explicit definitional insistence on causation itself, on, that is, its physical ingredients rather than 
mathematical representations or teleological interpretations” (1987, p. 251).  Selection is to be 
distinguished from drift because the physical property differences which constitute the hereditary 
variation that is being differentially reproduced are not merely correlated  with differences in 
reproduction – they are causally relevant  to them.   But cannot a statistical interpretation of selection 
and drift also make this distinction?  In order to make such a determination of causal relevance and so 
distinguish selection from drift, we must be able to tell expected fitness (reproductive success) from 
actual fitness (reproductive success).   This is clearly an essential part of the statistical interpretation.  
And it is here, I think, that we see causal processes entering into this interpretation.  In order to provide 
a fitness estimate for an organism in a particular context, we have to do just as Hodge states and make 
judgments about which sorts of causal pro cesses count as selection in this interaction.  In effect, causal 
processes are hidden in fitness estimates.  This is clear, for example, in Brandon’s discussion of the 
case of the moths where he points out the importance of relativizing the fitness estimate to the context 
and determining whether the selective environment is homogeneous or heterogeneous.  In effect, what 
this does it to extend or restrict the set of causal processes that will be considered selection in a given 
context and to embed them in the assigned fitness value.  In this way, the statistical interpretation does 
have causal-explanatory content - there is not actually any disagreement over the importance of causal 
processes in producing differences in fitness. 
Up to this point, Hodge’s and the statistical interpretation can be reconciled, but what happens when 
we turn to the second point, that selection should be taken as a process?  Here the dispute is over how 
to explain what actually happened - how fitness differences generate differences in actual reproductive 
                                                             
2
 Sober, E.  (1984). The Nature of Selection .  MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 
3
 Walsh, D.M., Lewens, T., and Ariew, A. The Trials of Life: Natural Selection and Random Drift.  
Philosophy of Science (in press). 
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Brandon, R.  (2002). The Difference Between Drift and Natural Selection: A Reply to Millstein. These 
proceedings, Session 4.  
Comments on Jon Hodge’s paper 
Megan Delehanty 
 success.  Hodge and Millstein claim that we need to distinguish discriminate from indiscriminate 
sampling.  In order to count as selection, the process(es) by which the actual reproductive success was 
achieved, have to be those that were antecedently identified as causally relevant properties of the 
system in estimating fitness values.  Causal processes act to realize certain levels of reproductive 
success and fitness differences (propensities) cannot constitute causes here.  Brandon and Walsh, on 
the other hand, claim that there is only one process, sampling, and that it is the outcome that allows us 
to distinguish between selection and drift.  Walsh and co-authors claim (p. 15) that “though there are 
causal processes, even forces, which change trait frequencies, these cannot be identified with natural 
selection because these forces also cause drift”.  Yes, but in any particular context, might we not be 
able to (at least in theory) say whether a particular process is related to a physical property which varies 
between individuals?  Fitness may be a supervenient property, but there is some physical basis for it 
and some subset of physical properties will, in interaction with the environment, be causally related to 
an organism’s reproductive success.   Despite his insistence on outcomes, Brandon seems to hint that 
he too may take process into account.  Consider his statement in his conclusion that “Drift is any 
deviation from the expected levels of reproduction due to  sampling error.  Selection is differential 
reproduction that is due to (and in accord with)  expected differences in reproductive success.” Could 
we not take this to suggest that causal processes which act after the establishment of the physical 
differences underlying fitness do make a difference to whether something is selection or drift?  
Otherwise, why make this distinction between “due to” and simply “in accord with”?  Perhaps this 
disagreement with Millstein is not that the process does not matter at all, but that both outcome and 
process need to be considered. 
 
So far I have considered a view of selection as a causal process and the view of it  as a statistical theory 
about population structures.  The third alternative Hodge argues against is selection as a dynamical 
theory.  Note that Walsh and co-authors also distinguish between force and causal processes in the 
quote I just read.  So what is the difference and how does it make a difference whether we talk of 
forces or of causal processes?  My understanding of Hodge’s paper is that he identifies two problems 
with the concept of force as applied to selection (and perhaps to biological systems in general). The 
first is the non-additivity of various contributions to the net effect observed on trait or gene frequencies.  
Especially relevant to the case of selection is the change is causal structure that may accompany a 
change in the population structure.  The second problem seems to be the inability to formulate physics -
style laws applying to selection.  Because natural selection consists of the processes of interaction of 
organisms and their environment, and we cannot distinguish any agency or force from these objects 
and their interactions.  Because of the spatiotemporal specificity of these processes, there can be no 
general statement of law but only potentially well-confirmed generalizations about the workings of 
selection in specific conditions and referring to organisms possessing specified properties.  If all we are 
talking about here is making a distinction between forces as (perhaps) being capable of a law-like 
description while causal processes are more compatible with a more localized description, it may be 
that the dynamical theory of selection is also reconcilable with the causal view. 
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